Abstract. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems of Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection in information theoretic settings. Specifically, we give perfectly secure protocols for the above problems in n party settings, tolerating a computationally unbounded semi-honest adversary, who can passively corrupt at most t < n/2 parties. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first such information theoretically secure protocols in a multi-party setting for all three problems. Previous solutions for Distributed Private Matching and Cardinality Set Intersection were cryptographically secure and the previous Set Disjointness solution, though information theoretically secure, is in a two party setting. We also propose a new model for Distributed Private matching which is relevant in a multi-party setting.
Introduction
Consider the following problem: Alice has a set A of values and there exists an element a ∈ A. Bob also has a set of values B. Alice wants to check if her element a belongs to Bob's set B or not; i.e., if a ∈ B or not. Alice does not want to reveal her element a to Bob and nor does Bob want Alice to know about any of the elements in his set. Alice should ultimately learn if her element belongs to Bob's set or not and nothing more. And Bob should not learn anything (neither about Alice's value nor about its presence in his set). This is the private matching problem. In the distributed private matching problem proposed by Ye et al. [16] , Bob's dataset B is distributed across n servers such that t or less servers cannot come together and reconstruct his dataset.
Consider another problem: Alice and Bob have sets A and B respectively and Alice wishes to find out if A ∩ B = φ. Alice and Bob also do not want to reveal any other information about their datasets to either party. The only information that Alice should gain is whether A ∩ B = φ or not and Bob learns no new information. This is known as the private set disjointness test [6] .
Suppose Alice and Bob have the sets A and B respectively and Alice wants to find out the cardinality of the set A ∩ B. The solution should only reveal |A ∩ B| to Alice and should not reveal any more information about Bob's dataset to Alice and at the end of the solution, Bob should not gain any extra information about Alice's dataset. This is the Cardinality Set-Intersection Problem [3] .
Private Matching has a lot of motivating examples from real life. For example, assume Alice has a highly sensitive information and wants to know if Bob has any record of the same. Bob, concerned about the security of his data and in order to cater to needs across the globe, has distributed all the information he has, in a database over n servers. Bob is willing to help Alice, but at the same time is not ready to reveal any other information that might help Alice get his dataset. Also, Alice does not want to reveal her sensitive information to Bob. For example, Alice could be a credit card service provider and Bob could have the set of all credit faulters from a single service. Alice might want to check if her customer belongs to bad credit union before agreeing to provide services and Bob would not want Alice to gain information about anyone else on the list. The Distributed Private Matching protocol gives solution to such problems.
As another example, suppose that a community social services centre has a list of drug abusers in the age group [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . A school administration in the locality wants to find out if its school is 'clean' or not. Since this is highly sensitive information the centre would not like to reveal any information or names in the list and would be willing to reveal only whether there are report cases of drug abuse from the school. This is an example of private set disjointness test. Again, if the school wants to know the number of students on the list and the centre is willing to reveal the number but does not want to divulge any more information, it becomes an example of the cardinality set intersection.
Existing Literature: Private matching was introduced as a private two-party matching problem by Freedman et al. [3] , who solved the problem under cryptographic assumptions, using oblivious polynomial evaluation with a public-key homomorphic encryption system. In the protocol, Alice has an element a and Bob has a dataset B = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b m }. At the end of the protocol, Alice gets to know if his element a belongs to Bob's Dataset B. The protocol does not reveal Alice's element a to Bob and Alice knows nothing more than whether a ∈ B. Ye, Wang and Pieprzyk [16] extended this problem to a Distributed scenario. In Distributed Private Matching, Alice has a value a and Bob has his dataset B = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b m } distributed among n servers such that t or less servers cannot discover Bob's Original Dataset while t + 1 or more servers can reconstruct Bob's dataset. In [16] , a protocol for distributed private matching problem under cryptographic assumptions is provided.
Quite a few protocols exist for the set disjointness problem. Freedman et al. [3] proposed a protocol for two-party set disjointness under cryptographic assumptions, based on the representation of datasets as roots of a polynomial and oblivious polynomial evaluation techniques. The protocol reveals information about the cardinality of set intersection. It is very efficient against honest-but-curious adversaries but invokes expensive sub-protocols to work against malicious adversaries. Hohenberger and Weis [5] had used similar construction as in [3] and proposed a protocol in cryptographic setting (the security proof relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem). Their protocol assumes an honest Alice while Bob can be malicious and again reveals information about the cardinality of the set intersection. Kiayias and Mitrofanova [7] proposed three protocols for set disjointness. The first protocol works on a relatively smaller domain for set disjointness, the second uses a new primitive called superposed encryption based on Pedersen commitments [13] , the third uses a multi variate polynomial to reduce the high round complexity of the second protocol. Both [5] and [7] work in the two party setting. [17] provided the first information theoretic solution to the private set disjointness problem. [17] presented two protocols using Sylvester matrices technique for two-party set disjointness with round complexity O(1). While the first protocol is secure against honest-but-curious adversaries, the second protocol is secure against malicious adversaries.
The Cardinality Set-Intersection problem was previously studied in [3] in the two-party setting. In [7] , Kiayias et al. studied private set disjointness as mentioned above which can be looked at as a restricted version of Cardinality Set Intersection. In [8] , Kisner et al. studied the problem in the multiparty setting and proposed efficient solutions for both honest-but-curious and malicious adversary under cryptographic assumptions, using zero knowledge proofs. Vaidya and Clifton [15] presented a protocol for cardinality set intersection that is scalable and efficient in cryptographic settings and hence suitable for data mining applications.
Also, multi-party set intersection problems in information theoretic settings have been studied in [9] and [12] . Though there exist protocols for set intersection and in general for Multi-Party Computations, using them to solve set disjointness or cardinality set intersection will be an overkill and highly inefficient. Our goal is to design efficient customised protocols as opposed to using generic abstract protocols.
Our Motivation and Contribution: From the literature, we find that existing solutions for private matching are in cryptographic settings. Also, the Distributed Private Matching proposed in [16] is essentially between two parties, where the data set of the second party is distributed among n servers. In this paper, we propose the first information theoretically secure protocol for Distributed Private Matching in the model proposed in [16] . We then propose a new model for Distributed Private Matching in a multi-party setting. The distributed private matching in our new model can be looked at as a general n-party Private Matching, where each party has a dataset and Alice has a value a and wants to know if a belongs to any of the n datasets. Here, the parties distribute their datasets among themselves such that t or less parties cannot come together and gain information about any honest party's dataset. Thus the parties themselves act as the servers used in the 2-party setting. The n-party Distributed Private Matching is useful in many scenarios. For example, suppose there are n trading agencies who store information about the available resources in a region. This information is sensitive and to ensure its safety, they share it among each other, so that any set of t or less agencies cannot get the information of any other agency. Now assume that Alice is a trader interested in setting up a factory over this region but needs to know if she can get the necessary resources for her production from any of the trading agencies. But Alice does not want to reveal her requirements to the agencies till she can get a confirmation that they will be of help. In such a case, n-party Distributed Private Matching is helpful. We also propose an information theoretically secure protocol for n-party Distributed Private Matching, secure against a semi-honest adversary.
Set Disjointness has been handled in information theoretic setting previously [17] , but only in a 2-party setting. We provide the first multi party information theoretically secure protocol for set disjointness, secure against a semi-honest adversary. In our model, there are n parties where each party's dataset is distributed among the n parties, such that t + 1 or more parties need to come together to reconstruct the entire dataset, similar to our proposed model for n-party Distributed Private Matching.
Privacy law is the area of law concerned with the protection and preservation of the privacy rights of individuals. The law of privacy regulates the type of information which may be collected and how this information may be used. Many privacy rules and regulations like HIPAA, GLBA and SOX [10] exist that restrict companies from sharing their data as it is to other parties. For example, there could be a hospital database and there could be a vendor who wants to check if the technology used by his mobile results in complaints such as ear ache, headache etc. Also there could be a vendor who wants to check for multiple ailments which could result from the use of his product. So, he would like to find out if a threshold number of customers have complained of these ailments by checking with the hospital database. Also, the hospital's database would be governed by privacy rules like the ones mentioned above. Hence, this problem is an example for multi-party cardinality set intersection.
The existing solutions for Cardinality Set Intersection problem (both in 2-party and n-party setting) are in cryptographic settings. We provide the first multi party information theoretically secure protocol for Cardinality Set Intersection problem, secure against a semi-honest adversary.
Hence our contribution in this paper is to provide information theoretically secure protocols for Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set-Intersection in a multi-party setting against a semi-honest adversary. We also show how to adapt our protocols to work against an active adversary in the same model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to address these problems in in a multi-party scenario, in information theoretic settings.
Model Definitions and Preliminaries
In this paper, we will be considering two different models. The first model is adapted from [16] , while the second model is proposed by us. We provide a perfectly secure protocol for Two party distributed private matching problem in the first model, while we propose perfectly secure protocols for n-party distributed private matching, Cardinality Set Intersection and Set Disjointness in the second model. We now briefly discuss these models. We also give the details of various existing sub-protocol, used in this paper.
Model for 2-Party Distributed Private Matching [16]
Here Alice and Bob are two parties. Alice has a secret value a ∈ F and Bob has a private dataset B = {b (1) , . . . , b (m) }, consisting of m elements from a finite prime field F, where |F| > n. The dataset of Bob is distributed among n servers in a manner as explained in section 2.5, where n ≥ 2t + 1. There exists a passive adversary with unbounded computing power, who can control at most t servers out of the n servers. We assume that Alice does not interact with Bob directly. Instead Alice contacts the set of n servers to perform the private-matching operations. We assume also that no server colludes with Alice to cheat and only Alice learns the output of any operation. More precisely, the following conditions should hold [16] :
1. Correctness: If Alice and the servers honestly follow the steps of the protocol, then protocol works and Alice learns the correct result of the operation specified in the protocol.
2. Alice's Security : If Alice is honest, then at the end of the protocol, the adversary controlling t servers should not get any information whatsoever about a.
3. Bob's Security : Provided that no server colludes with Alice, the protocol ensures that Alice does not get any extra information other than the output of the operation. In addition, any t or less servers should not able to find out any information about Bob's dataset.
Model for n-party Distributed Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection
Here we consider a complete synchronous network of n parties, denoted as P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, who are pairwise connected by a secure channel. There exists a centralized adversary, having unbounded computing power, who can passively control at most t < n/2 parties. This is a valid assumption as information theoretic MPC against a computationally unbounded t-active passive adversary is possible iff n ≥ 2t + 1 [2] . By passive adversary, we mean that all the parties under the control of adversary follow the prescribed steps of the protocol, but may try to learn something extra from the messages seen during the execution of the protocol. Each party P i has a private data set
consisting of m elements from a finite prime field F where |F| > n (the protocols presented in this paper will also work if the number of elements in each data set is different). All computation and communication in our protocols are done over F. To ensure the secrecy and distributed nature of datasets, each party P i distributes his dataset among all other parties, as shown in Section 2.5 and Section 2.5. We now state the security definition, associated with n-party distributed private matching, Cardinality Set Intersection and Set Disjointness.
Security Definition for n-Party Distributed Private Matching Here Alice has an element a ∈ F, whose presence she wants to check for in any of the n datasets. For this, she interacts with the n parties. As in [16] , we assume that no party colludes with Alice and only Alice learns the output of any operation. More precisely, the following should hold as in [16] :
1. Correctness: If Alice and the parties honestly follow the steps of the protocol, then protocol works and Alice learns the correct result of the operation specified in the protocol.
2. Alice's Security : If Alice is honest, then at the end of the protocol, the adversary controlling t parties should not get any information whatsoever about a.
3. Party's Security : Provided that no party colludes with Alice, the protocol ensures that Alice does not get any extra information other than the output of the operation. In addition, if P i is honest, then his dataset B i is secure against a passive adversary controlling at most t parties.
Security Definition for n-Party Set Disjointness Here the n parties want to know whether (B 1 ∩ B 2 ∩ · · · ∩ B n ) = φ or not and nothing more. More specifically, the following conditions should be satisfied at the end of the protocol, even if t < n/2 parties are passively corrupted by a computationally unbounded adversary:
1. Correctness: If the parties honestly follow the steps of the protocol, then they learn if
2. Party's Security : The adversary should not get any extra information about the input and output of honest parties, other than what can be inferred by the input of t corrupted parties (i.e., the dataset of these parties) and the output of t corrupted parties (which is (
Security Definition for n-Party Cardinality Set Intersection Here the parties want to know |B 1 ∩ B 2 ∩ · · · ∩ B n | and nothing more. More specifically, the following conditions should be satisfied at the end of the protocol, even if t < n/2 parties are passively corrupted by a computationally unbounded adversary:
1. Correctness: If the parties honestly follow the steps of the protocol, then the parties learn
2. Party's Security : The adversary should not get any extra information about the input and output of honest parties, other than what can be inferred by the input of t corrupted parties (i.e., the dataset of these parties) and the output of t corrupted parties (which is |B 1 ∩ B 2 ∩ · · · ∩ B n |).
Sharing a Value s Among n Parties
Consider the following problem: there exists a dealer D ∈ P. D has a secret s ∈ F, which he wants to share among P 1 , . . . , P n , such that if t or less parties pool their shares, then they will know nothing about s. On the other hand, if t + 1 or more parties pool their shares, then they can reconstruct s. This problem is called secret sharing. One of the methods to solve this problem is Shamir Secret Sharing [14] , where to share s, D chooses a random polynomial f (x) of degree t, such that f (0) = s. D then gives P i his share s i = f (α i ), where each α i is a publicly known distinct element from F.
To reconstruct s, each party produces his share s i . Once all the n shares are available, anyone can interpolate the t degree polynomial f (x) passing through (α i , s i )'s and hence reconstruct s = f (0). It is easy to see that if t parties pool their shares, then they will know nothing about s [14] .
d-Sharing and its Properties [1]
We say a value s ∈ F is d-shared among the parties in P, if every (honest) party P i ∈ P is holding a share s i of s, such that there exists a degree-d polynomial p(·) with p(0) = s and p(α i ) = s i for every P i ∈ P. , we need to use the multiplication protocol specified in section 2.4.
Multiplying Shared Values
Let a and b be two values, which are Shamir shared (i.e., t-shared) among P 1 , . . . , P n using degree-t polynomials f (x) and g(x) respectively. Thus party P i has shares a i and b i of a and b respectively. Then the parties P 1 , . . . , P n can generate the Shamir shares of c = ab by using the multiplication protocol of [4] as follows: Let d i = a i b i . Each party P i Shamir share d i , say using degree-t polynomial h i (x). This results in party P i holding the share-share d 1i , · · · , d ni of d 1 , . . . , d n respectively. Then from Lagrange's interpolation, the degree-t polynomial h(x) = n i=1 w i h i (x) is the polynomial that Shamir shares c, where
To get j th share of c, party
It is easy to see that during this process, an adversary passively controlling at most t parties does not get any information about a, b and c [4] . Also, the method works only if n > 2t which holds in our case. 
, and find their products in the first round and then make pairs among the resulting products(after the first round) and multiply them in the next round and so on. 2
Dataset Distribution of Parties
In both the models, namely the one presented in section 2.1 and section 2.2, the parties distribute their dataset in a specif manner. We now give the details of how this is done.
Dataset Distribution for Two Party Distributed Private Matching
Here Bob on having the data set B = {b (1) , . . . , b (m) } does the following: Bob forms a polynomial F (x) such that the elements of his set B are roots of the polynomial (i.e.,)
Bob then Shamir shares each C i among the n servers. It is easy to see that even if t or less servers combine their shares, they will have no information about B. On the other hand, B can be reconstructed by pooling the shares of any t + 1 or more servers.
Dataset Distribution for n-party Distributed Private Matching Here each party P i on having a dataset B i = {b (i,1) , . . . , b (i,m) } distributes it in the following way: P i forms a polynomial F i (x) such that the elements of his set B i are roots of the polynomial (i.e.,)
Party P i then Shamir shares each C (i,j) among the n parties. It is easy to see that even if t or less parties combine their shares, they will have no information about B i . On the other hand, B i can be reconstructed by pooling the shares of any t + 1 or more servers.
Dataset Distribution for n-party Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection Here each party P i on having dataset B i = {b (i,1) , . . . , b (i,m) }, distributes it in the following way: for j = 1, . . . , m, party P i Shamir shares b (i,j) among the parties in P. Since each element in the dataset is individually shared using a t-degree polynomial, it implies that if P i is honest, then each element of his dataset B i is secure against a passive adversary controlling at most t parties. Moreover, any set of t + 1 or more parties can reconstruct B i by pooling their shares.
Checking If a Shared Value is Zero
Nishide and Ohta [11] present an efficient and deterministic protocol to check if a shared value is zero or not. More specifically, the protocol takes [s] t as input, where s is shared using Shamir sharing and outputs the following: The protocol performs 81l multiplications of shared values, where l = log(|F|) and takes 8 rounds. In the rest of the paper, we use this protocol for testing if a shared value is zero. We shall henceforth refer to this protocol as TEST-IF-ZERO. Remark 1. The TEST-IF-ZERO protocol of [11] is a deterministic protocol, without any error, which we use in the rest of this paper. A drawback of this protocol is that it performs very large number of multiplications. In the last section of this paper, we present a simple protocol for testing if a shared value is zero, involving significantly less number of multiplications. However, this protocol is probabilistic and gives the correct output, except with an error probability of 1 |F| .
Two-Party Distributed Private Matching Protocol
Recall that in the 2-party distributed private matching, Bob has a private data set B of m elements, which he has distributed among n servers, say S 1 , . . . , S n , as explained in section 2.5. Alice has a secret element a ∈ F, whose presence she wants to check in Bob's dataset. For this she interacts with the servers. We now present a perfectly secure protocol for this problem. Before proceeding further, we give the following trivial lemma:
Lemma 3. The value a belongs to B iff F (a) = 0, where
The proof is obvious and it follows from the definition of F (x).
2
The high level idea of the protocol is as follows: Alice first Shamir shares the values a, . . . , a m among n servers. Hence all the servers, apart from having the shares of the coefficients of F (x), now also have the shares of a, . . . , a m . The servers then compute the Shamir shares of V j = C j a j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, using the multiplication protocol (see section 2.4). Since F (a) = m j=0 V j , by a linear combination of all the shares that a server has, each server gets his share of F (a). Till this point, the servers have generated the Shamir shares of F (a). Now if the servers give their shares of F (a) to Alice, then Alice could reconstruct F (a) and find whether a belongs to B. But directly revealing F (a) to Alice will violate Bob's security, as Alice would come to know about one point on F (x).
Since Alice wants to know only if a ∈ B or not, all we need to find out is if F (a) = 0 or not. Before proceeding further to prove the properties of 2-Party DPMP, we make the following claim.
Claim. In protocol 2-Party DPMP if Alice is honest, then a passive adversary controlling at most t servers does not get any information about a even after knowing t shares of a, . . . , a m .
Proof: The proof follows easily from the properties of Shamir sharing and simple linear algebra. For a complete proof, see APPENDIX A. 2 Lemma 4. Protocol 2-party DPMP satisfies the properties of 2-party distributed private matching.
Proof: The correctness property is trivial. The secrecy of Bob's dataset against a passive adversary controlling at most t servers follows from the properties of Shamir sharing. The secrecy of Bob's data set against a passive Alice follows from the secrecy of TEST-IF-ZERO. Finally, secrecy of Alice's a follows from Claim 3.
Lemma 5. Protocol 2-party DPMP communicates O(n 2 m) field elements and involves one invocation of TEST-IF-ZERO. The protocol takes two rounds.
Proof: In the setup phase, the parties communicates O(nm) field elements for data set distribution. In the computation phase, there are m multiplications and hence it communicates O(n 2 m) field elements. Since all the multiplications are independent, by lemma 2 it can be done in parallel in one round. Moreover, setup phase takes one round. 2
n-Party Distributed Private Matching Protocol
We now present a perfectly secure protocol called n-party DPMP for distributed private matching in n-party settings. For this, we use the model presented in section 2.2. Recall that in this model, there are n parties denoted as P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, where each P i has a private dataset
Moreover, the dataset B i is Shamir shared among the n parties; i.e., the parties hold [C (i,j) ] t , for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0, . . . , m (see Section 2.5). Alice has a secret element a. Alice wants to know if a ∈ (B 1 ∪ . . . ∪ B n ). Before proceeding further, we give the following lemma. 
After this step, the parties have [F (a)] t . To ensure that no more information is revealed to Alice than what is necessary, the parties run the TEST-IF-ZERO protocol on [F (a)] t and reconstruct the output towards Alice, so that Alice gets to know only if F (a) is zero or not and nothing more. Alice checks if the reconstructed value is 0 or not to find if a ∈ (B 1 ∪ B 2 ∪ · · · ∪ B n ). Protocol n-party DPMP is formally given in the following table.
n-Party DPMP Setup Phase: Alice shamir shares a, a 2 , a 3 , · · · , a m among the n parties and each party Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n distributes his dataset Bi using the polynomial Fi(x) = P m j=0 C (i,j) x j among n parties using Dataset Distribution scheme described in section 2. Lemma 7. Protocol n-party DPMP satisfies the properties of n-party distributed private matching.
Proof: Follows directly from the protocol steps and properties of Shamir sharing and TEST-IF-ZERO protocol. 
n-Party Set Disjointness Protocol
We now present a perfectly secure protocol called n-party Set Disjointness for n-party set disjointness problem. Recall that in this problem, there are n parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, where each P i has a private dataset B i = {b (i,1) , . . . , b (i,m) }. Moreover, each b (i,j) is Shamir shared among the n parties for j = 1, . . . , m. Thus the parties hold [b (i,j) ] t . The parties want to know if B 1 ∩ . . . ∩ B n = φ or not. We first present a protocol called Gen-E l , which we will later use in solving the n-party set disjointness as well as cardinality set intersection problem.
Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we have given perfectly secure protocols for private matching, set disjointness and cardinality set intersection problems in information theoretic settings, secure against a computationally unbounded passive adversary. Future work would be to come up with efficient protocols that can work against more powerful adversaries such as byzantine and mixed adversaries. Also, improving the communication complexity of the protocols presented in this paper is another interesting future direction.
